Agricultural technology, productivity and employment: Policies for poverty reduction by Thirtle, Colin G. et al.
Agrekon, Vol 44, No 1 (March 2005)  Thirtle, Piesse & Gouse 
 
 
                                                
Agricultural technology, productivity and employment: 
Policies for poverty reduction 
 
C Thirtle1, J Piesse2 & M Gouse3
 
I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live 
together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is an ideal, which I hope to live for, 
and to see realised. But my lord, if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. 




This paper begins by arguing that agricultural economics has an important 
contribution to make to the economic transition of the new democratic South Africa. 
Policies are required to reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality, but does the 
work of agricultural economists provide the policy makers with the information 
necessary to make the correct choices?  In this context, we update our recent work on 
technology, efficiency and productivity in South African agriculture, for both the 
commercial and smallholder sub-sectors. For the commercial sector, this means 
extending the total factor productivity index and estimates of the demand for labour. 
For the smallholder sector, there are new results on the impacts of GM cotton and 
white maize on output and employment. However, this piecemeal approach treats the 
two sectors as entirely separate, when they are actually interdependent. Thus, a 
Ricardian model of dualistic agriculture is used to explain the historical development 
of dualism in agriculture, especially how the native agriculturalists were impoverished 
by the colonists. Then this model is adapted to resemble the Harris-Todaro model of 
urban unemployment is order to represent the present dual agricultural sector. This 
allows the current policy options to be compared, although real data is needed to 
estimate the relationships and so the full analysis remains incomplete.  
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the contribution that agricultural economics needs to 
make if Nelson Mandela’s ideal is to be realised. Economic apartheid will not 
end until reasonable opportunities and incomes are available to the mass of 
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the population rather than being the privilege of the few. Recent data shows 
that the problems are still enormous. The Labour Force Survey reported by 
Statistics South Africa put the September 2002 rate of unemployment at 41.8% 
according to the broad definition (wanting work) and 30.5% by the narrow 
definition of actively seeking a job. The proportion of the total population 
classified as living in poverty in 1995 was 50%, but as Table 1 shows, the figure 
was 70% for the rural population and the disparity between urban and rural 
dwellers is even more pronounced with respect to access to facilities. There 
was also a huge racial disparity, with 1% of whites below the poverty line, as 
compared with 61% of Africans and a pronounced gender bias (May, Woolard 
& Klasen, 1998). About 60% of female-headed households were poor, as 
compared with 30% with male heads, but some of this reflects the rural 
location of a greater proportion of female-headed households. Finally, with 
respect to inequality, the Gini coefficient is around 0.6, which is as high as the 
most unequal societies in Latin America (McDonald & Piesse, 1999).  
Table 1:  Rural–urban distribution of poverty and access to basic services (1995) 
Location  Population share (%)  Poverty share (%)  Poverty rate (%) 
Rural 50.4  71.6  70.9 
Urban 49.6  28.4  28.5 
Total 100  100  49.9 
In dwelling facilities 
Service Running  water  Sanitation Electricity  Telephone 
Urban  (%)  74.1 65.5  82.4 48.4 
Rural (%)  16.8  10.9  21.1  7.5 
Source:  McDonald and Piesse (1999), adapted from May, Woolard and Klasen (1998). 
The next section considers the role of agricultural economists and how we can 
contribute to poverty reduction. Section three reviews and updates the work 
on productivity in commercial agriculture with emphasis on maintaining 
employment as wages rise. In South African agriculture, the existence of a 
semi-subsistence sector may allow poverty to persist in peaceful coexistence 
with healthy growth of per capita incomes in the rest of the economy. Thus, 
section four similarly updates our work on technological change in the semi-
subsistence sector, with emphasis on genetically modified crops. Section five 
considers the issue of dualism, showing that the two agricultural sectors need 
to be modelled together so that policies can be compared.  
 
2. Why  agricultural  economics matters 
 
Forty years after Mandela’s trial, his ideal is closer to realisation than all but 
the most optimistic would have expected forty years ago. But as Fidel Castro is 
supposed to have said after his guerrillas had entered Havana and Batista had 
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fled, “OK, that was the easy part, now we have the tougher job of running the 
country”. Within a few years the Cuban economy was in ruins - Che Guevara, 
may have been a good communist but he was a lousy economist.4  S o u t h  
Africa has also had a revolution, but unless we, as members of LEVSA, do 
better than Guevara, Mandela’s vision will not become a reality. 
 
South Africa is the world’s social science laboratory, so we are in the right 
place at the right time, with everything to play for. In the European Union, 
agricultural economists simply add to butter mountains and wine lakes that 
cripple the taxpayer. In the USA, they increase the exported surpluses that 
lower world prices and destroy developing country agriculture. However, in 
South Africa it is the poor majority who will gain most from agricultural 
growth, which increases the incomes of smallholders. At the same time, 
growth in the commercial sector leads to lower food prices, benefiting the 
urban poor. The new South Africa has to succeed in reducing the current 
levels of unemployment, inequality and poverty as soon as possible, while in 
the longer run equality of opportunity and economic freedom requires 
education.  
 
2.1  What do we contribute? 
 
What role do agricultural economists play? The stylised facts are quite simple. 
We obviously generate information on economic relationships. For instance, 
we estimate price elasticities for inputs and outputs, which should allow 
policy makers to know what the results of policies such as taxes and minimum 
wage legislation. But there is another function. The R&D work of agricultural 
scientists in public institutions (i.e. the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) 
and the universities) and private companies (such as multinationals like 
Monsanto and Delta and Pineland) produces new biological, land saving, 
technologies that increase yields. Mechanical technology, that saves labour, 
has always been much more the province of private manufacturers, such as 
the tractor producers. These technologies are taken from the trial plot or the 
engineering laboratory to the farmers, either by public sector extension agents 
 
4 Guevara served as chief of the Industrial Department of the National Institute of Agrarian 
Reform, President of the National Bank of Cuba and Minister of Industry, which put him in a 
fine position to wreck the economy. His performance would not have surprised the Russians, 
who had a story about the May Day parade. The massive arrays of troops, tanks, guns, rockets 
and aircraft are followed by a couple of dozen paunchy, shambling middle aged men in 
business suits. “What on earth are they doing there”, asked a foreign observer and his 
Russian companion replied, “Ah, those are economists – you cannot imagine their awesome 
destructive power”. 
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or company sales staff. This diffusion process imposes further lags and uses 
further real resources, but hopefully the result is improved productivity.  
 
The agricultural economist has no role in this process except evaluation, so we 
are practically accountants.5 Is this worth doing?  We are increasingly sure that 
it is. We do know that throughout history, nations with accounting systems do 
better than those without, provided that the accounting system is informative. 
Michael Lipton (1989) has long argued the reason behind Africa’s failures. The 
underlying problem has been that the data and measurement of economic 
performance has been too poor to guide policy.6
 
2.2  From data, to analysis, to policy: Can we reduce unemployment, 
inequality and poverty? 
 
Data is the input for the measurement of economic activity, followed or 
accompanied by causal explanation. Griliches (1994) makes the case that even 
in the USA, data is the constraint limiting progress in the study of R&D and 
productivity. Given data, the economists have to perform their key function, 
which is to inform the policy process in order to make it more effective. The 
economist has no business dictating the goals of economic activity (Robbins, 
1935), but still has a role to play in the policy process by ensuring that the 
policies are efficient in obtaining the democratically identified objectives. This 
means accurate targeting and attributes such as incentive compatibility. They 
may also play a role in implementation, for example in extension. But there is 
no positive marginal product unless there is an improvement in social welfare.  
 
Ruttan (1982) makes an issue of articulation. The system is only as good as its 
weakest link and the segments must fit together. The US has been more 
successful than most and organisation has some part in that. It is not 
coincidental that the USDA is the primary data collection agency and is also 
the largest single employer of agricultural economists working in research. 
The data collectors are not separated from the users as they are in the UK and 
 
5 This is a slightly pejorative term to most economists, but Sir John Hicks was awarded a 
Nobel prize for his work, which he regarded as basically accountancy. Valuing social science 
research is an infant industry, which seems to have so far paid little attention to this product, 
which is simply finding out for the policy makers which new technologies work best. 
Whatever our contribution, we should live by the same rules as we apply when evaluating 
R&D systems, which is simply, what is the social rate of return? See Schimmelpfennig and 
Norton (2003) for a recent contribution and review of the literature. 
6 On the need for more information on South African agriculture, see Frick and Groenewald 
(1999). 
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most other countries.7 The rest of the research community is concentrated in 
the land grant colleges, some with job descriptions that include extension, 
with the physical scientists and some of the data collectors also at these 
institutions. Finally, the policy process involves the Deputy Secretary of 
Agriculture, who is usually on loan from a Land Grant college.  
 
South Africa does not have the resources to emulate the USA, but some effort 
is needed to ensure articulation. The national Department of Agriculture 
collects good data, although with some gaps. The ARC and the universities do 
good scientific research. In the work summarised here, we measure 
agricultural performance and explain successes and failures. If this can be 
translated into policy and those policies are implemented by the Provincial 
Departments of Agriculture, the poor will be better fed and have more income.  
 
3. Technology  and  productivity in commercial agriculture: An update 
 
Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal. 
Albert Einstein 
 
We turn now to the information available from studies of production and 
productivity in commercial agriculture. The ratio of aggregate output to an 
aggregate of all inputs combined gives a measure of total factor productivity 
(TFP) or multifactor productivity. Thirtle, Sartorius von Bach and Van Zyl 
(1993) used this approach to produce the first TFP index for South African 
commercial agriculture, which is updated in this paper.8  Figure 1 shows that 
before 1965, the index of outputs and inputs rose at the same rate, so TFP did 
not grow. From 1965/66 to 1999/2000 the growth rate was 1.7%, mainly due to 
the continued growth of output but little change in inputs. Then, from 
1984/85, there was a marked decline in inputs, at a rate of 1.1% per annum. 
The paper was updated from 1991 onwards after the Central Statistical Service 
(CSS) belatedly released data on farm employment, which had previously 
been unavailable. The extended series show that there was a marked fall in 
output in 1994/95, followed by a recovery.  The input series also fell in1994/5 




7 In the UK, when the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) was formed it had economists, 
but they found that being surrounded by scientists was not to their liking, so they left and set 
up the Agricultural Economics Unit at University of Oxford. In South Africa, the Impact 
Assessment Unit of the ARC is an attempt to include social scientists. 
8 Much of the earlier work is easily available in Thirtle, Van Zyl and Vink (2000). Thanks to 
Ferdi Meyer and PG who helped to update the index. 
















































































































































































Figure 1:  Output, Input and TFP Indices 
 
The cause of the decline in inputs is explained in Figure 2, which shows labour 
and machinery inputs only. The Figure shows that machinery was substituted 
for labour throughout the period, but at varying rates. Employment declined 
from the late 1960s. The Pass Laws contributed, as they became severe in 1968, 
but not so much as agricultural policy, which included cheap credit, even 
negative real interest rates and tax breaks, which allowed capital equipment to 
be written off in the year of purchase. The social and economic costs of these 
distortions must have been considerable. There is both the human suffering of 
the unemployed rural workers and the cost to the rest of the economy of 
agriculture using scarce capital that was needed elsewhere. The decline in 
employment continued until the poor growing seasons of 1981-3, but by then 
the credit and tax concessions had largely gone; the gold price had plummeted 
and the Rand had been drastically revalued. These events had the combined 
effect of making a domestic input like labour far cheaper relative to capital and 
led to a dramatic reversal of the historical trend, with labour use increasing 
considerably, replacing expensive capital.  
 
Thus, even in 1993/4, employment was still at the same level as it had been 
twenty years earlier, but in the next two years, the first CSS reports showed a 
decline in employment of 57%, which resulted in about 60% black 
unemployment in rural areas. Data from the October Household Survey 
showed a decline in formal agricultural sector employment, from 1,212,000 in 
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1995 to 504,000 in 1997, a fall of 58%. This coincided with the democratically 
elected government taking office and the introduction of minimum wage 
legislation, combined with a package of farm workers’ rights. There is little 
doubt that employment decreased, but the extent of the decline is not clear, as 
later statistics show a lesser fall. For instance, recent issues of the Abstract of 
Agricultural Statistics show a fall of 34% in employment in agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing. The most recent release from Statistics South 
Africa, the Census of Commercial Agriculture 2002, states there was a decline 
over the nine years from 1993 of only 13.9%. This includes the recovery years 
from 1998 to 2002, but it still puts employment at 940,815 in 2002, whereas the 










































































































































































Figure 2:  Machinery and labour inputs 
 
These figures are not entirely comparable, but they cannot be reconciled, 
which illustrates that the margin for error in recoding these important labour 
statistics is totally unacceptable and makes estimating the employment effects 
of policies like the 2003 minimum wage almost impossible. To judge the effects 
of an increase in the minimum wage it is necessary to estimate the elasticity of 
labour demand with respect to the wage. The South African Department of 
Labour (1996) reports estimates of this elasticity to be around –0.7, which would 
mean that a 10% increase in wages would reduce employment by 7%. They note 
that this is not extreme, but still not acceptable where unemployment is high. 
The historical estimate of the elasticity of labour demand for commercial 
agriculture is of a similar magnitude.  The two most recent estimates for the 
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sector are Bailey et al (2003, Table 2), which reports –0.49 and Balcombe et al 
(2000), which is -0.59. However, the elasticity is likely to vary by region and 
crop. Thus, it is useful to have crop specific estimates, such as Conradie (2004), 
which reports elasticities as low as –0.3 for regular workers in the wine and 
table grape sectors, and a high of –0.55 for seasonal workers. 
TFP growth in South African agriculture is mainly the result of reducing the 
input of labour, as is the case in the developed countries. But, in the developed 
countries labour is scarce and hence expensive, whereas in South Africa it is 
abundant and cheap. The problem with the minimum wage legislation is that 
it is likely to exacerbate this process, which is unsatisfactory when job creation 
is a major objective.  Much more could be reported on commercial agriculture, 
but it would detract from the focus on the employment problem. Instead, we 
now turn to recent research on the African smallholder sector, which is mainly 
on technical and institutional change. There, lack of data for the sub-sector, 
apart from scattered sample surveys, is likely to prevent proper investigation 
of the policy options.9 For instance, the employment potential of GM crops is 
only now being investigated. 
 
4.  GM technology in smallholder agriculture 
 
4.1   Background 
 
In the non-commercial or smallholder sector, the introduction of genetically 
modified crops may improve the welfare of the poor. South Africa is the only 
African country in which GM cotton and yellow and white maize have been 
commercially released. Bt crops contain the genes controlling the production 
of a natural insecticide, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), which acts specifically on 
Lepidoptera, including bollworm in cotton and stem borers in maize and is 
harmless to all other insects. In 1998, the smallholders in Makhatini Flats, a 
rain fed cotton area in North East KwaZulu Natal, began adopting Bt cotton. 
In only four years, adoption spread from handful of pioneers to over 90% of 
the farms in 2001/2 (Bennett, 2002; ISAAA, 2004).  
 
Monsanto owns the Bt gene that is used by Delta Pineland in developing the 
varieties used, all commonly called Bollgard. Several modern non-GM 
varieties were also available from Vunisa Cotton (Zulu for “to harvest”), the 
sole supplier of seeds and chemicals in Makhatini Flats. Vunisa is a private 
company that also provided support services for the farmers through their 
extension officers, including credit for land preparation, chemicals and seed. 
 
9 But see the information collected in Lipton, Ellis and Lipton (1996) and Lipton, De Klerk and 
Lipton (1996). 
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Credit was crucial, as most farmers cannot afford to grow cotton without it and 
the forthcoming crop was the only collateral. Vunisa was able to lend on this 
basis because it was the sole buyer, sending the cotton to their gin in Pongola. 
 
The main source of information of cotton production is a survey of 100 
farmers, conducted jointly by University of Pretoria and University of 
Reading, covering the 1998/9 and 1999/2000 seasons. Data were collected on 
household background, farming practices and problems, the reasons for 
adopting Bt cotton and input costs and returns. Rather than relying on farmer 
recall, most of the crucial information used in evaluating the technology came 
from Vunisa farm.  
 
The smallholders are all Zulus, with no large commercial producers. Cropping 
land is unfenced, so livestock damage crops due to the communal grazing 
system. Because of out migration of younger men, 42% of the household heads 
were female and 76% were over forty years old. Mixed cropping is the norm, 
with an assortment of maize, beans and vegetables, grown for subsistence and 
cotton is the only cash crop. As is common in South Africa, most households 
(75%) also kept livestock and almost 30% earned off-farm income from sources 
such as  the police service, truck driving and mining. Over 60% of the farmers 
“owned” less than five hectares of land, with the largest concentration being 
37%, in the 2.5-5 hectare group. Cotton areas varied from one hectare to a 
single farm of twenty-five hectares.  
 
Evaluating the technology is complicated by two factors. In the first year 
farmers with less than 5 hectares had an average yield of 510kgs/ha and only 
15% adopted the Bt variety. Those with over 5 hectares produced only 378 
kgs/ha and 25% were adopters. Thus, any simple comparison will be biased 
by this positive correlation of farm size and adoption and the negative 
correlation with yield. Farm accounting efficiency measures, based on 
Vunisa’s data, were reported in Thirtle et al (2003). This showed that there was 
no clear advantage to the Bt variety in the first year, but the second year 
results are far clearer and the outcome entirely unambiguous. The yield gain 
of 40% and the lower chemical cost easily offset the extra seed cost, so that the 
average gross margin for the adopters is 675 Rand compared with 428 Rand 
for the non-adopters, or 58% higher. The share attributable to the Bt variety was 
28%, which is worth 190 Rand per hectare. This result can be compared with 
Monsanto’s trial results, which showed a gain of 944 Rand per hectare, due to 
higher trial plot yields and a greater reduction in chemical use (Bennett, 2002). 
 
The 40% yield increase reported by Thirtle et al (2003) for 1999/2000 may not 
be unreasonable. Studies for developed countries show lower yield gains, but 
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Qaim, Cap and de Janvry (2003) and Qaim and de Janvry (2005) compare 
commercial farms and smallholders in Argentina and found that the yield gain 
to large farms is 19%, while the smallholders gain 41%. This is remarkably 
similar to the South African results and is attributed to the different financial 
and human capital constraints that cause smallholders to invest less in 
chemical pest control, with a resulting increase in crop damage. This is also 
applies to South African small-farmers. By the time a small-scale farmer has 
noticed bollworms, bought pesticides with a limited amount of credit and 
started to spray, severe damage has already been done. Many farmers 
indicated that they were not even able to apply pesticides on their whole field 
due to lack of time, knapsacks, labour and the cost of pesticide. With poor 
education level causing problems with mixing pesticides and the calibration of 
knapsack spraying nozzles, the efficacy and efficiency of pesticide applications 
is in doubt for a large number of small-scale farmers.  
 
However, the latest results show that single year samples are of limited 
significance. In 2003/4 there was a small but careful sample survey conducted 
by University of Pretoria and CIRAD and the preliminary results show that in 
a drought year there is no significant yield advantage to the Bt variety. Thus, 
the variations due to the weather mean that any study based on a sample for a 
single year can be entirely misleading. If it is true that there is no gain in some 
years and substantial advantages in others, we can say only with confidence 
that the expectation is positive and that Bt seems to reduce the annual 
weather-related variance. Even this is a gain to risk averse, poor farmers. 
 
4.2 Pesticide  productivity: why yields increase so much in smallholder 
agriculture  
 
Thirtle  et al (2003) also modelled the efficiency of farmers adopting Bt. 
However, pesticide was treated in exactly the same manner as the other 
inputs, which is not entirely acceptable. There is no output gain from its use if 
there are no pests and when there are, the pesticide controls damage, keeping 
yields close to what they would have been. Thus, in common with Huang et al 
(2002) for China and Qaim, Cap and de Janvry (2003) and Qaim and de Janvry 
(2005) for Argentina, Shankar and Thirtle (2005) take a ‘damage control’ 
approach to estimating the role of pesticides and Bt technology. This explains 
why Qaim, Cap and de Janvry (2003) found relatively large yield gains in the 
case of smallholders. As pesticide input increases, the abatement function 
approaches 1, so there is no destruction due to pest damage and maximum 
potential output is realized, but as pesticide application declines, it falls towards 
0. The results for the conventional part of the model add nothing to those above, 
but the damage control parameters are highly significant, with signs that 
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conform to expectations. Particularly, increasing pesticide does reduce damage 
and the Bt dummy variable is positive, which confirms that adoption of Bt 
varieties is effective in controlling pest damage, with less pesticide application.  
 
The impacts of pesticide use are shown in Figure 3. The significant gap 
between the non-Bt and Bt curves illustrates the pest control efficacy of Bt 
adoption. With no pesticide applied, non-Bt producers would realize only 
about 16% of potential output. By adopting Bt, about 40% of potential output 
can be recovered even without application of insecticide. At each point, the 
slope of the Bt curve is lower than the slope of the non-Bt curve, suggesting 
that Bt adoption reduces the marginal productivity of pesticide by providing a 
natural substitute. At the current average application rate of 2.2 litres per 
hectare, a non-adopter reaches only about 36% of potential output. A Bt user, 
at the current average application rate of 1.1 litres per hectare, half of the non-
adopter average, realizes 55% of potential output. Although use efficiency 
cannot be determined without reference to input costs, realization proportions 
of 36% and 55% suggest under-use. Almost 9 litres would be required to get 
close to 100% of potential output. Another important point in the Figure is that 
the non-Bt damage control curve is convex for a significant portion, indicating 
increasing marginal efficacy of insecticide input at lower ranges. As will be 













































































Figure 3:  Damage control 
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The efficiency of insecticide use can be assessed by comparing the Value 
Marginal Product (VMP) of insecticide with the insecticide price. This was 
calculated holding all other inputs constant at the sample average values, 
while varying the quantity of insecticide. An additional litre of pesticide costs 






































Figure 4:  Per-hectare insecticide productivity (non Bt) 
 
Figure 4 is striking in that the VMP curve has an inverted U shape instead of 
the typical monotonically declining shape. However, this is not too surprising 
given the convex non-Bt damage control curve in Figure 3. Indeed, as 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) showed, this shape frequently occurs in the 
damage control specification and by ruling it out, conventional specifications 
like the Cobb-Douglas can miscalculate the productivity of pesticide input. 
The Figure shows that the current average level of 2.1 litres per hectare, is 
clearly sub-optimal, since it lies on the rising portion of the VMP curve. The 
correct level is 4.7 litres/ha, where the declining VMP intersects the input 
price. The calculations indicate that variable profits at this level exceed those at 
zero insecticide use by about 13 Rand ($1.3) per hectare. Thus, 4.7 litres per 
hectare is the optimal rate for the average producer and the current level at 2.1 
litres per hectare means that application is at less than 50% of the optimum.  
 
Thus, whereas Huang et al (2002) reported pesticide overuse of 40 kg/ha in 
China, African smallholders use far too little and consequently suffer serious 
crop losses. This is why Bt gives impressive gains in yields in Makhatini Flats. 
There are several factors that could cause under-use in Makhatini. First, there 
are financial reasons. Pesticide purchases often require larger cash outlays 
than are available to smallholders at Makhatini, particularly mid-season when 
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reserves are low and other crops and activities compete for available cash and 
many farmers complain they are unable to get sufficient credit. Secondly, those 
who can afford the chemicals, do not own a knapsack sprayer and would hire 
someone do perform the task. But, labour availability for spraying poses a 
similar dilemma. Over the Christmas period, an important time in the South 
African cotton cycle, hired labour is often unavailable (Gouse, Kirsten & 
Jenkins, 2003). Thirdly, pest infestations vary considerably between years and if 
farmers apply insecticide proactively on the basis of long-run experience, 
applications will be inadequate in a bad year. This highlights the difficulties of 
cross-sectional analysis. A season that is unusually wet results in pesticide 
residue being washed off the plants, so that further application is required. 
 
A similar analysis of the Bt users showed that the VMP curve was 
monotonically declining with increased pesticide applications. At current 
average application rates of about 1 litre per hectare, Bt users are also under-
applying insecticide relative to the optima of almost 2 litres per hectare. Thus, 
having halved pesticide inputs, Bt adopters are using about half the optimal 
amount of pesticide, like the non-adopters. Although the Bt gene provides 
resistance to the bollworm, so that bollworm-specific pesticides sprays are no 
longer needed, Hofs and Kirsten (2002) note that the leaf hoppers and aphids 
are causing increasing damage. Clearly, the current applications of pesticides 
to deal with these other pests are inadequate. Indeed, if adequate pesticide 
was used for these pests, they would replace the bollworm chemicals, leaving 
the overall application rate close to its initial level. 
 
For both the adopters and non-adopters, these optimal application rates take 
no account of the environmental and health costs of pesticide use. Private 
optimal application rates exceed the socially optimal application rates. Thus, 
the under-use reported here would be reduced if these negative externalities 
could be measured and allowed for. 
 
4.3 Institutional  failure in Makhatini Flats 
 
This review shows that Bt cotton had been adopted by over 90% of the cotton 
farmers in Makhatini Flats and seemed to offer substantial advantages over 
non-Bt cotton varieties. Indeed, despite the variability of benefits the evidence 
shows that Bt cotton is technologically superior given higher expected yield 
and lower risk. The institutional arrangements were also successful. The Land 
Bank supplied credit and the risk of default was shared between the Land 
Bank and Vunisa. Vunisa administrated production loans from the1998/99 
season and there was a loan recovery rate of close to 90%. 
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Then, in 2001/2 a new company, Makhatini Cotton (Pty) Ltd (MCG) erected a 
new gin on the Flats, right next to the Vunisa depot. Some farmers avoided 
repaying their loans by selling to the new gin, effectively reducing their 
collateral to zero. Vunisa lost substantial sums through the defaulting loans 
and the following year no longer offered inputs on credit. There is a clear 
lesson here that is widely understood already in Africa. The only asset that can 
be used as collateral for a loan is the crop itself. Loans are not made for the 
purchase of maize seed as the farmers can eat it, but with cotton, if there is 
only one mill, the company owning the mill can make loans, since the output 
is a guarantee of repayment. If there is more than one mill the farmers will 
default and inability of financial corporations to enforce repayment of loans, 
combined with the fact that most farmers on the Flats cannot finance their own 
cotton production inputs, means little production. 
 
Thus whereas with complete markets there are policies to preserve 
competition and prevent rent seekers from obtaining monopoly profits, in this 
situation monopsony needed to be maintained. Until the institutional 
arrangements are changed in such a way that lenders can recover their loans, 
an alternative approach is required. The current arrangement is that Makhatini 
Cotton do the planting and the farmers receive a share of the revenue for 
weeding, harvesting and otherwise caring for the crop. This approach does not 
solve the principal and agent problem, as some farmers steal the cotton they 
have produced and deliver it to Vunisa or even to MCG. It may transpire that 
MCG is showing great initiative and determination in trying to establish 
irrigated cotton and maize or wheat production units with the aim of 
establishing small-scale farmers on these areas over the longer term, but so far 
it has simply created a monopoly that leaves the farmers no choice at all. 
 
The history of Bt cotton in Makhatini Flats shows the technological potential of 
GM crops in an African smallholder environment. But it also shows that good 
governance and institutional structure is required or the potential gains will 
not be realised. Farmers cannot be expected to change their behaviour quickly: 
they have seen a procession of failed schemes and broken promises. The South 
African Development Trust Corporation (STK), the Department for Development 
and Aid (DDA), the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation (KFC) and 
the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) have all had roles in credit 
provision on the Flats over the years. Advances in science and technology are 
easy compared with establishing the social and economic conditions necessary 
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5.  Modelling agricultural dualism and poverty reduction 
 
Thus far, this paper has claimed that agricultural economics has to play a key 
role in ensuring that the best policies are chosen to deal with chronic levels of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality. It also showed that useful information 
on the commercial sector, such as demand elasticities for labour, allow the 
effects of a policy such as a minimum wage increase to be assessed. The 
section on GM technology described the benefits in the non-commercial sector, 
noted the lack of good data that hampers any attempt to compare policies and 
that inadequate institutions can prevent development. What is still missing is a 
model of dualistic agricultural economies, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa 
are still incomplete. How difficult can it be to adapt existing dual economy 
models, to cover the dual agricultural sector? This section provides a 
preliminary discussion on this issue. 
 
We begin by offering an explanation of the historical development of dualistic 
agriculture in South Africa, which shows why the African farmers were 
impoverished. Mostert (1992) considers the historical forces that shaped the 
creation of modern South Africa: the terrestrial migration of the West African 
tribes, which collided with the maritime exodus of Europeans on the frontier 
of the Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century. By the mid-19th century, 
the agrarian sector consisted of large-scale farms owned by white settlers, 
operating largely with hired labour, some settler estates with indigenous 
tenant farmers, and free indigenous farming on black-owned land. Mbongwa, 
Vink and Van Zyl (2000) explain how the settlers used the powers of the state 
to impoverish the indigenous farm population, in order to ensure that there 
would be cheap labour, first on the farms and then increasingly in the 
dominant mining sector. This situation has already been modelled and a 
simplified graphical version is developed next. 
5.1  History and the impoverishment of African farmers10
Hansen (1979) provides one of the few attempts to explain how settler 
agriculture operated, making the extreme assumption that the settlers acquire 
all the good land and the indigenous population are left with unlimited 
supplies of marginal land. In this Ricardian model, the colons (settlers, 
commercial farmers) produce an export crop and the native farmers 
(subsistence, smallholders) grow food. This is shown in Figure 4, where the 
horizontal axis is the whole indigenous agrarian labour force divided between 
commercial and smallholder employment, but not according to the usual 
 
10 See also Binswanger and Deinenger (1996) on the historical issues and Porter (1978) on 
modelling South African-type economies. 
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marginal efficiency conditions. The diminishing marginal product of labour in 
commercial agriculture (MPLC) is measured on the right hand vertical axis, but 
the wage of the smallholders on the left is equal to the average product of 
labour (APL). Smallholder average productivity is constant because there is an 
unlimited supply of marginal land, with zero MP and thus a rent of zero. 
Hence, rather than the output being divided between rent and wages, 
according to marginal productivities, labour is the only claimant and thus gets 
a wage equal to its AP. In the initial equilibrium at E*, the settlers have hired 
E1C of indigenous labour. The MP in the commercial sector is equal to the AP 





































Figure 5:  Impoverishment of indigenous farmers 
 
This surplus land model gives some results that are quite different from the 
Lewis (1954) model with surplus labour. Most importantly, increases in 
population do not affect the wage in either sector. The extra labourers simply 
use more land, so the extensive margin is extended but there is no effect on the 
intensive margin. The first observation is that the commercial farmers have to 
pay enough to attract labour and if the productivity curve of the smallholders 
can be shifted downwards, they will get more labour at a lower wage and so 
will the mines. Thus, Mbongwa, Vink and Van Zyl (2000) found that the 
settlers used all the powers of the state to impoverish the indigenous farm 
population. Withholding technology has the same beneficial effect on the 
settlers’ profits, as Hansen (1979) shows. The key issue is that the settlers 
always profit from lower wages in the subsistence sector, which requires only 
that the value marginal product of smallholder labour and hence its wage be 
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reduced, say to W1S. This lowers the commercial wage and expands 
commercial employment and both increase the return to the intra-marginal 
land, which was the triangle AW0CE* and now becomes the larger triangle 
above the line W1SW1C. Historically, this was achieved by depriving the 
indigenous farmers of land, capital, modern inputs and improved technology. 
The results are entirely compatible with the historical evidence for Southern 
Africa, where apart from taking their best land, other measures used to 
impoverish the indigenous population included imposing livestock, hut and 
poll taxes; road rents; location, vagrancy and pass laws and confinement to the 
reserves. In Hansen’s model, a tax on cultivating marginal land falls entirely 
on labour and reduces the real wage. Most importantly, the colons gain from 
technical progress on the intra-marginal land but their returns to land are 
reduced by any improvement on the marginal lands. They always have a clear 
interest in keeping the incomes of the subsistence farmers as low as possible. 
5.2  Wages and employment in a dualistic agricultural sector11
So, what can be done in the current economic and political environment to 






































Figure 6:  Wages and employment 
 
The Ricardian model suggested by Hansen can be adapted to modern 
conditions by dispensing with the assumption of unlimited marginal land and 
introducing unemployment. The effects can be seen in Figure 6, adapted from 
the Corden and Findley (1973) version of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model 
 
11 For a review of agricultural employment see Vink and Kirsten (1999). 
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of urban unemployment.12 Initially, the total supply of rural labour is assumed 
to work in the smallholder (semi-subsistence) sub-sector, or be employed in 
commercial agriculture. The marginal productivities and hence the wages of 
both groups are equal at the equilibrium point E*. 
 
The effect of raising the commercial sector wage to W1C is first to reduce 
employment in the commercial sector. At W1C, commercial employment is 
reduced from E* to E1C and the difference (LU) is the unemployment generated 
by the higher wage. Then, there are two possibilities. Either the unemployed 
return to the smallholder sector, driving smallholder wages down to W1S, or 
they remain unemployed while seeking new commercial employment. The 
second case gives the same kind of equilibrium as in gravity models of urban 
unemployment. In equilibrium, the expected commercial wage (actual wage 
times by the probability of employment) must equal the smallholder wage: 











                                                
  
where LC  is commercial employment and LNS is all non-smallholder labour 
(commercial labour, LC and the unemployed, LU). This can be rearranged to 
give: 
C
C WL WL =   
This condition and the requirement that the wage equal the marginal product 
in each sector is met only by points A and E*, that lie on a rectangular 
hyperbola. This has the property that all rectangles beneath it are of equal 
area, so conceptually, the new commercial wage bill is being spread over the 
whole non-smallholder labour force. They all get the expected commercial 
wage, which is the weighted average of the new commercial wage and the 
zero wage of the unemployed. The two rectangles under the rectangular 
hyperbola are equal and the expected w a g e  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  w a g e  i n  
smallholder agriculture.  
 
Fields (2005) begins by stating that the Harris-Todaro model “has become the 
workhorse for analysing labour market policies in dualistic labour markets”. 
He uses the model to compare policies and reaches the conclusion that 
“traditional sector enrichment”, or rural development, unambiguously 
improves welfare, whereas modern sector policies are more ambiguous in 
their effects. The same would almost certainly prove to be true in this model of 
traditional and commercial agriculture. It the objectives are to reduce 
 
12 See Corden (1974), Chapter 6, for a lengthier presentation. 
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unemployment, poverty and inequality, it seems to be clear that the minimum 
wage will not fare too well. Neither of the two possible results considered 
above is good. In the first case, the smallholder wage falls and the poorest 
have become still poorer, so poverty has increased. Inequality has also 
increased as the commercial wage has risen and the smallholder wage has 
fallen. Also, underemployment in the smallholder sector must increase as it 
absorbs more labour. The loss of output is the triangle that is the difference 
between the product of LU  of labour in the commercial sector and the 
smallholder sector.  
 
Figure 6 is deliberately constructed to show that in the second, gravity model 
case, the imposition of a minimum wage simply causes a proportion of those 
employed in commercial agriculture to become unemployed, so unemployment 
is obviously greater. The expected commercial wage is unchanged and some 
are without wages, so inequality has also increased. The loss of output is 
greater as the unemployed produce nothing. It is the triangle AE1CE* and the 
entire rectangle below it, instead of just the triangle above the APS schedule. 
Thus, poverty must also increase. This outcome less likely the greater the 
degree of tenure granted to workers under the new policy, as there is less 
point in the unemployed continuing to seek commercial employment. Thus, 
the effect of the minimum wage on all three policy objectives is negative.  
 
If the intention is redistribution from farmers to labourers, then the suggested 
land tax is far better, but the tax will be more effective in reducing poverty and 
inequality if it is redistributed to the smallholders, rather than the commercial 
labourers, as the smallholders are the poorest group. In this model, poverty 
reduction means increasing the wage, as the poor are the labourers in both 
sectors. This could be done without changing the marginal conditions by 
taxing the intra-marginal land, which just takes part, or all, of the rent triangle 
and if pushed to the limit will result in zero land rents. This does not reduce 
employment (so long as it is not pushed to the point where farmers go out of 
business), while it does reduce poverty and especially inequality. Alternatively, 
land (instead of income) could be redistributed in favour of the subsistence 
farmers, which is the option studied in Van Zyl, Kirsten and Binswanger (1996). 
This would be effective in reducing inequality, but the effect of transferring land 
from the higher productivity sector to the lower productivity sector must have 
costs. For instance, food for the urban poor may become more expensive. 
 
What policy change does this simple model suggest are best?  Anything that 
increases the marginal product of labour, in either sector, will increase the 
wage in both sectors. So, better technology will shift the AP and MP schedules 
upwards, but so will giving labour more capital to work with or more modern 
  55Agrekon, Vol 44, No 1 (March 2005)  Thirtle, Piesse & Gouse 
 
 
intermediate inputs. All policies that actually increase labour productivity will 
reduce rural poverty. These would include improving the institutions in the 
non-commercial sector and providing services and credit. Indeed, all measures 
that increase productivity in the semi-subsistence sector will have the greatest 




All the evidence to date suggests that agricultural productivity growth is the 
most effective way of reducing poverty in the shorter term, and the poorest 
sector, which is smallholder agriculture, should be the main target. IFPRI 
(2004) list R&D driven agricultural productivity growth and good governance 
as the two fundamental prerequisites for success in African agriculture. 
Similarly, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) lists 
ag r i c u l t u r al  p r o du c t i vi t y  g r o w t h  i n  A f r i c a as  o n e  o f  i t s  fou r  m ai n  r e s e a r c h  
areas for the coming years. Thirtle, Lin and Piesse (2003) use all the available 
data on $1 per day poverty to show that research led technological change in 
agriculture generates sufficient productivity growth to give high rates of 
return in Africa and Asia. This has a substantial impact on poverty, currently 
reducing the number by 27 million per annum, whereas productivity growth 
in industry and services has no impact. The per capita “cost” of poverty 
reduction by means of agricultural research expenditures in Africa is $144 and 
in Asia $180, or 50 cents per day, but this is paid for by output growth. There 
must be other ways of reducing poverty, but so far, agricultural productivity 
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